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CHAPTER 8 
Environmental Law 
RICHARD H. JOHNSON and JEFFREY G. MILLER 
§8.1. Introduction. Perhaps the most significant development in 
environmental law in Massachusetts during the 1971 SuRVEY year was 
the enactment of Chapter 732 of the Acts of 1971. Chapter 732 added to 
the General Laws two important provisions that created rights in pri-
vate individuals and political subdivisions to compel compliance 
with environmental laws and regulations: first, it added Section lOA to 
G.L., c. 214 to permit ten or more persons or any political subdivision 
to sue in equity to prevent "damage to the environment"; 1 second, it 
added Section lOA to G.L., c. 30A to allow ten or more persons to in-
tervene in any adjudicatory proceeding in which "damage to the 
environment" is or might be in issue.2 Although the new statutes are 
brief, some rather complex questions of legislative intent and statutory 
interpretation are likely to arise when citizens or political bodies at-
tempt to exercise their new rights in court. Parts A and B of this chapter, 
which analyze the statutory language of Chapter 732, reveal some of 
the more difficult issues and potential problems. 
A person dealing with large quantities of oil in Massachusetts, 
whether as the owner or operator of a vessel, oil terminal, bunkering 
operation, tank farm, oil storage unit, or oil transportation device, 
must comply with both federal and state statutes and regulations. While 
these parallel sets of laws are not drastically inharmonious, each con-
tains its own vagaries; together they create a veritable maze of regula-
tions, potential double liability, and an operational difficulty of 
some consequence to vessel owners. 3 Part C of this chapter will ex-
plore the scope of applicable federal and Massachusetts statutes and 
regulations, note some questions relating to them, and discuss their 
practical operation. 
RICHARD H. joHNSON is associated with the firm of Bingham, Dana and Gould, Bos-
ton, and is chairman of the Environment Committee of the Boston Bar Association. 
JEFFREY G. MILLER is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§8.1. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 732, §I. 
2 I d. §2. 
3 The lack of congruence in federal and state water pollution laws is not typical; for 
the most part, federal-state cooperation and parallel treatment is achieved. But compare 
33 U.S.C. §§1153, 1155-1158 with G.L., c. 21, §§26-53. The atypical situation existing in 
Massachusetts is probably best explained by the relative haste with which federal water 
pollution legislation was drafted and the almost complete lack of water pollution legisla-
tion in states other than Massachusetts at the time the federal bill was drafted. Since 
very few states had water pollution legislation extant, the federal authorities did not 
concern themselves with accommodating the legislation that did exist. 
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A. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
§8.2. Scope of the right. The private right of action created by 
G.L., c. 214, §lOA arises from any circumstances in which "damage to 
the environment" is a potential consequence. Damage to the environ-
ment is defined in the statute as "any destruction, damage or impair-
ment, actual or probable, to any of the natural resources of the com-
monwealth" and includes, without limitation, 
air pollution, wa.ter pollution, improper sewage disposal, pesti-
cide pollution, excessive noise, improper operation of dumping 
grounds, impairment and eutrophication of rivers, streams, flood 
plains, lakes, ponds or other water resources, destruction of sea-
shores, dunes, wetlands, open spaces, natural areas, parks or his-
toric districts or sites.! 
In Section lOA the legislature appears to have intended to shelter 
under the term natural resources every aspect of the physical environ-
ment that might be damaged by man. In its ordinary meaning, natural 
resources would seem to include virtually all of the Commonwealth's 
natural, physical assets.2 Although natural resources is not statutorily 
defined for the purposes of Section lOA, it is defined by the statute that 
establishes the responsibilities of the Department of Natural Resources; 
as there defined, natural resources includes all fish, game, birds, for-
ests, cultivated flora, land and soil resources, water, minerals, and 
natural deposits.3 This specific definition of natural resources would 
certainly seem to be included within the general meaning of the term 
as it appears in Section lOA. The intent of the legislature is not so 
clear, however, as to the injuries against which the environment is to be 
protected as comprehended by "destruction, damage or impairment." 
The only other time those terms are used is when the statute declares 
that "damage to the environment" does not encompass "any insignifi-
cant destruction, damage, or impairment" to the natural resources of 
the Commonwealth.4 In framing the "insignificant damage" exclu-
sion, the legislature may have contemplated two objectives: (1) to ex-
clude strictly personal environmental wrongs such as cutting down a 
healthy tree upon one's own land or polluting one's own pond, and 
(2) to allow the court some flexibility in disregarding de minimis in-
jury where the potential environmental harm appears upon first 
examination to be trivial (e.g., in the case where a factory emits one 
objectionable puff of smoke in lighting its boiler). Because the "insig-
nificant damage" clause necessitates a preliminary determination on 
the part of a court as to the extent of the damage alleged, thus pro-
tecting against frivolous suits, the terms "destruction, damage and 
§8.2. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 732, §1, adding§lOA toG.L., c. 214. 
2 Natural resources is defined as "capacities (as native wit) or materials (as mineral 
deposits and waterpower) supplied by nature." Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1507 (1961). 
3 G.L., c. 21, §I. 
4 Actsofl971, c. 732, §I. (Emphasis added.) 
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impairment" ought to be very broadly construed so as to carry out 
the intent of the legislature to reach every possible significant injury 
to the environment. 
In giving the courts the power to screen out causes of action involv-
ing insignificant damage, the legislature did not provide a yardstick 
for measuring "significance." The significance of environmental dam-
age could be measured in terms of monetary injury, by the extent of 
physical damage to the environment, or with reference to the ease with 
which the damage can be repaired. The continual pollution of a 
stream with phosphates in small quantities might not cause much 
monetary damage, but could very well permanently change the char-
acter of the stream. The apparent legislative intent to ignore only 
private environmental damage and environmental damage that is 
truly de minimis would seem to suggeSt that any environmental dam-
age that was not purely private or de minimis would fall within the 
ambit of the statute. 
Petitioners may enforce their rights under the new statute only when 
the environmental damage complained of violates "a statute, ordi-
nance, by-law or regulation the major purpose of which is to prevent 
or minimize damage to the environment."5 Ordinarily, it should not 
prove difficult to determine whether the major purpose of a particular 
statute or rule is to prevent or minimize environmental damage. The 
Compendium of Environmental Legislation6 contains over a hundred 
pages of citations to and brief descriptions of environmental laws 
and regulations. The major purpose of substantially all of the laws 
and regulations listed in the compendium clearly appears to be the 
prevention of damage to the environment. Other legislative and ad-
ministrative pronouncements, however, may raise a "major purpose" 
issue. Zoning ordinances, for instance, could be construed as having 
as their major purpose the prevention of environmental damage: 
Zoning regulations and restrictions shall be designed among 
other purposes to lessen congestion in the streets; to conserve 
health; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to pro-
vide adequate light and air; to prevent overcrowding of land; to 
avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the ade-
quate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, park 
and other public requirements; to conserve the value of land and 
buildings; to encourage the most appropriate use of land through-
out the city or town; and to preserve and increase its amenities.7 
Comparing the quoted language with the definition of damage to the 
environment, it can be seen that of the reasons for zoning regulation 
listed above, only "conserving health" and "securing safety from fire, 
panic and other dangers" are not comparable with specific environ-
' Acts of 1971, c. 732, §I. 
6 Mass. Office of Comprehensive Health Planning, Compendium of Environmental 
Legislation ( 1970). 
7 G.L.,c.40A,§3. 
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mental injuries enumerated in Section lOA of Chapter 214. Arguably 
even these two clauses could be construed as designed to prevent 
destruction of natural resources. Thus, an activity that violates a zon-
ing ordinance and causes or threatens to cause damage to the environ-
ment would seem to be an appropriate instance for invoking the new 
enforcement mechanism.8 
Because of the generality of many of the existing environmental 
regulations, the new private suit remedy offers some challenging 
opportunities to make law. The air pollution control regulations, for 
instance, provide: 
No person owning, leasing, or controlling a source of noise shall 
willfully, negligently, or through failure to provide necessary 
equipment, service, or maintenance or to take necessary precau-
tions cause, suffer, allow, or permit unnecessary emissions from 
said source of noise.9 
Perhaps Section lOA would allow ten citizens to force a contractor on a 
construction site to install mufflers-where possible-.-on all pneumatic 
hammers, on the ground that their noise emissions are "unnecessary." 
Examination will disclose an almost limitless number of other such pos-
sible applications of the environmental regulations presently in force. 
With sufficient citizen interest and available legal representation, many 
environmental regulations and statutes that previously have been 
loosely or never enforced may be tested in court by citizen prosecutors. 
It is unclear whether a violation of federal laws and regulations will 
support a cause of action under the new private remedy statute. Al-
though nothing in the statutory language denies enforcement to federal 
laws and regulations that have environmental protection as their 
purpose, a novel constitutional question would be presented if Sec-
tion lOA were interpreted to provide for private enforcement of federal 
law. Some federal statutes provide for their own private remedy; 10 
where the federal remedy conflicts with the state remedy, the latter is 
obviously invalid with respect to federal law because of the supremacy 
clause of the Constitution. Where federal law is silent as to private en-
forcement, however, the issue is not so clear. In an analogous situation, 
the federal courts have held that a state court determination of standing 
to raise federal questions does not bind federal courts, 11 and it would 
seem that for the same reasons a state statute cannot confer upon a new 
8 It is stating the obvious to say that an activity that violates a zoning ordinance but 
does not cause damage to the environment is not subject to citizen suit under the new 
Section lOA; without damage to the environment, there is no cause of action under Sec-
tion lOA. 
9 Mass. Air Pollution Control Regulations, Regulation 10.1 (1970). The regulations 
are discussed generally in 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law. §26.3. 
10 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §l857h-2 (providing for a private suit in a federal district court to 
enforce federal and state air pollution standards). Under Section l857h-2(e), remedies 
provided by state statutes or by common law are not precluded by the federal right of 
action. 
11 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,465-466 (1939). 
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class of persons the standing to enforce federal laws and regulations. 
If the federal law in question can be interpreted as affording a private 
remedy only by implication, it would not seem inconsistent with the 
federal scheme to permit enforcement by means of the state-created 
remedy. 12 A related issue is whether federal jurisdiction can be in-
voked either on the ground that a "federal question" has arisen be-
cause of a violation of federal law, or that diversity jurisdiction exists 
because the defendant is a nonresident ·of Massachusetts. Although 
Section lOA speaks in terms of relief being granted by a superior court 
of the Commonwealth, that should not in itself defeat federal juris-
diction.13 
§8.3. Procedure. General Laws, c. 214, §IOA1 creates a cause of 
action with respect to damage to the environment "whether caused by 
the respondent alone or by the respondent and others acting jointly 
or severally." A petition may be filed in equity or for declaratory relief 
in the superior court in the county in which damage to the environment 
is threatened or occurring; such petition must be filed by "not less 
than ten persons domiciled within the commonwealth," or by "any 
political subdivision of the commonwealth." The court will not act 
on any petition "unless the petitioners, at least twenty-one days prior 
to the commencement of such action, direct a written notice of such 
violation or imminent violation by certified mail to the agency respon-
sible for enforcing [the statute, etc., being violated], to the attorney 
general, and to the person violating or about to violate the same." 
The notice requirement may be waived by the court and a temporary 
restraining order issued immediately if the petitioners show that "ir-
reparable damage will result unless immediate action is taken." The 
petitioner may be required by the court to post a surety or cash bond 
of up to $500 "to secure the payment of any costs which may be 
assessed against the petitioners in the event they do not prevail." An 
action brought under Section I OA is to be advanced for speedy trial 
and may not be compromised "without prior approval of the court." 
If the court finds in favor of the petitioners, it may assess their costs, 
which may include "reasonable fees of expert witnesses but not attor-
ney's fees." Damages will not be awarded, even if there is a finding in 
favor of petitioners. 
If each of several persons is damaging the environment to an in-
significant extent, but the cumulative effect of their actions is signifi-
cantly damaging the environment, the question may arise as to 
whether each person may be sued separately or whether they all must 
be joined in the action. By creating a right of action where damage to 
12 See]. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-435 (1964) (private right of action is 
implied in Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
"See Railway Co. v. Whitton's Admr., 80 U.S. 270 (1871) (state-created rights cannot 
constitutionally be confined to state courts where federal jurisdiction is otherwise compe-
tent). 
§8.3. 1 Acts of 1971, c. 732, §I. 
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the environment has occurred, "whether caused by the respondent 
alone or by the respondent and others acting ... severally," the 
legislature has indicated that the cause of action ought to exist with 
respect to an individual doing insignificant damage to the environment 
if the cumulative effect of his damage and the damage of others falls 
within the prohibition of the statute. Statutory interpretation not-
withstanding, however, it would seem prudent to join all parties who 
were contributing to the environmental damage. 
The requirement that ten or more petitioners commence the action 
would ordinarily not appear difficult to satisfy if any kind of harm 
beyond the "aggrieved neighbor" situation is involved. The statute 
speaks in terms of a court's determination of the issue "upon the 
petition of not less than ten persons"; a decrease in the- number of 
petitioners subsequent to the filing of the petition should not be 
ground for dismissal as long as the case is otherwise meritorious. 
Although the "ten person" prerequisite has merit as an arbitrary 
standard for distinguishing between "public" and "private" harm, 
it ought not to be read as requiring that, if at any point in the suit 
there are not ten petitioners who can proceed, the action may not be 
maintained. Prudent petitioners, however, will choose to join with 
several more than ten to avoid an attempted dismissal by the respon-
dent during the course of the proceedings should one or more peti-
tioners fail to continue for any reason. 
The notice provision outlined in the statute is obviously intended 
to give public officials and the alleged offender time to put their affairs 
in order in hopes of avoiding litigation. Once a suit has been com-
menced, a court ought to take the three-week period into account in 
granting any further extensions to the defendants. The more specific 
the notice, the more resistant a court ought to be to requests of further 
delays of any kind in the proceedings. It may be wise, therefore, for 
petitioners to set aside their presumably normal reluctance to disclose 
their case too fully at the outset; they should specify in the notice at 
least the facts that would appear in the petition itself, perhaps in even 
more detail than would normally be the case for an initial pleading. 
Disclosure of detailed allegations in the notice will also assist any 
reviewing agency in its attempts to take early action. Since questions 
may arise as to the agency responsible for enforcement of the statute 
or regulation being violated, prudence would dictate sending notice 
to any agency of state government which might conceivably be in-
volved. Notice to the regional office of the federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency would also probably be helpful, even if not required 
by the statute, since that agency may frequently be a potential inter-
venor. 
The requirement that no suit or action shall be compromised without 
prior court approval is consistent with the protection of the public 
interest that is the purpose of Section lOA. Once the requisite number 
of petitioners have commenced an environmental damage suit, none 
of them is free, as an individual, to call a halt to the proceedings. An 
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analogy is provided by the federal rule of civil procedure governing 
class actions. Rule 23(e) provides that "a class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court." It has been 
held that Rule 23 requires the proponents of a settlement in a class 
action to show that the settlement is "fair and reasonable," weighing 
the likely results of the litigation against the consideration received 
by the class for not going forward. 2 In a real sense, Section lOA is a 
"class action" since any number of petitioners can join and since most 
types of environmental damage will affect a group much larger than 
the petitioners. Presumably, before approving a proposed settlement 
in a Section lOA equity proceeding, a court will weigh the likely out-
come of going forward and determine whether the settlement is "fair 
and reasonable" to all who might be affected. When settlement is 
proposed prior to any significant use of discovery, it may be necessary 
for the court to inquire into the merits of the parties' claims in order 
to determine the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed settle-
ment. Furthermore, before allowing the parties to compromise even 
where the settlement proposal appears "fair and reasonable," the 
court should ascertain that the proposed compromise meets the approv-
al of the responsible agencies. 
§8.4. Defenses. The new private right of action statute, G.L., 
c. 214, §lOA, states: 
It shall be a defense to any action taken pursuant to this section 
that the respondent is subject to, and in compliance in good faith 
with, a judicially enforceable administrative pollution abatement 
schedule or implementation plan the purpose of which is allevia-
tion of damage to the environment complained of, unless the peti-
tioners demonstrate that a danger to the public health and safety 
justifies the court in retaining j urisdiction. 1 
The statutory defense applies principally with respect to water pollu-
tion. The Department of Natural Resources has sought to enforce its 
regulatory water quality standards by means of abatement orders that 
have been issued against specific polluters.2 The abatement orders 
frequently prescribe a timetable in accordance with which the polluter 
must achieve compliance with the water quality standards over a 
period of months or years. When a Section lOA action is brought 
against a polluter who is subject to such an abatement order, he may 
raise in his defense his compliance with the order. If the polluter is 
"in compliance in good faith" with the order, he has an absolute de-
fense unless it can be shown that he is endangering public health and 
safety. 
2 Norman v. McKee, 290F. Supp. 29, 32(N.D. Cal.l968). 
§8.4. 1 Actsofl97l,c. 732,§1. 
2 Water quality abatement schedules may be issued as part of a compliance order, pur-
suant to G.L., c. 21, §44, by the Water Pollution Control Division of the Department of 
Natural Resources. 
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The legislature has left to the courts the definition of "in compli-
ance in good faith." It does not seem likely that the legislature intended 
to permit a defense based upon asserted good faith where in fact there 
has been no substantial compliance with the applicable abatement 
schedule or implementation plan. The best of motives or the purest 
of hearts is irrelevant if the pollution level does not reflect them. If the 
legislature intended to provide a defense for the polluter who was in 
substantial compliance with an abatement schedule although violating 
the schedule in an insignificant way, it probably had in mind those 
situations in which a court of equity would normally refrain from 
acting against a defendant who was using his best efforts to comply 
with a schedule. 
An understanding of the basic purposes of the statute may be help-
ful in discerning the meaning of "compliance in good faith." Section 
lOA marks a basic departure by the legislature from the common law 
tradition that places the power to enforce public rights in the hands 
of public officials and denies that power to private citizens,3 even 
where private interests are also affected. The legislature would not 
have modified the traditional common law rules unless there was 
concern on the part of the legislature over the job being done by the 
administrative agencies charged with enforcing environmental legisla-
tion. Had the legislature been satisfied with the motivation and aggres-
siveness of the enforcement agencies, it could merely have added to 
existing budgets and provided for more employees, steps that would 
have been consistent with enforcement tradition. The inclusion of 
private citizens in the environmental standards enforcement scheme 
is clearly a response to overwhelming concern on the part of the Com-
monwealth's citizens that sufficient progress was not being made in 
the fight against pollution. 
It may also be helpful to describe a common scenario that has as 
its parties a polluter and a state agency. The former agrees with the 
latter to cease polluting a particular waterway in accordance with an 
abatement schedule. After failing to comply, the polluter approaches 
the state agency and complains either that the compliance deadlines 
are too short to permit the incorporation of necessary technological 
changes, or that control technology is not being developed rapidly 
enough to make compliance feasible, or that compliance with the 
established deadlines would cause severe economic hardships. An 
administrative or, less frequently, a judicial extension is granted. 4 The 
polluter then fails to comply with the extended schedule and seeks 
further extensions. The effect of continued extensions is the creation 
of a "license to pollute." 
With the above example in mind, the intent of the legislature can 
perhaps be better discerned. "In compliance in good faith" should be 
read as imposing two separate standards upon the polluter who would 
3 Cf. Jones v. Town of Great Barrington, 273 Mass. 483, 174 N.£.118 ( 1930). 
4 G.L., c. 21, §46 gives the superior court jurisdiction in equity to enforce abatement 
orders issued by the Division of Water Pollution Control. 
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claim the defense: not only must he be in substantial compliance with 
an effective abatement schedule, but also he must show that the ex-
tensions of his abatement schedule, if any, have been requested and 
obtained in good faith. By reading "good faith" as a separate require-
ment, the merits of a polluter's entire course of action may be examined 
judicially. A polluter who had obtained repeated extensions of his 
schedule despite the feasibility of his compliance with the original or 
succeeding schedules would have no defense; nor would he have a 
defense if he could not fully justify his present scheduled deadline. 
Only by shining judicial light on an entire course of dealing can the 
presence or absence of good faith be determined. It is consistent with 
the requirement of a separate good faith standard that the abatement 
schedule or implementation plan be "judicially enforceable," i.e., it 
should already be in effect, so that a judge may order compliance there-
with if necessary, and it should be definite in its deadlines and stan-
dards, so that a judge can determine whether it is indeed being met. 
The compliance defense it not valid if the petitioners can show 
that the court is justified in retaining jurisdiction of the case by rea-
son of danger to the public health and safety created by the polluter. 
This provision again demonstrates the legislature's intention to pro-
vide for judicial review of administrative decisions. If a polluter is 
in compliance with an abatement schedule but the schedule discharge 
level constitutes "a danger to public health and safety," there is ob-
viously something wrong with the abatement schedule. By empower-
ing the court to retain jurisdiction over the proceedings in spite of the 
respondent's compliance, the legislature has indicated that in such a 
case the court should fashion an appropriate remedy to prevent further 
danger to public health and safety until such time as the administra-
tive agency involved takes steps to provide a suitable revised abate-
ment schedule. There is no requirement that the danger be imme-
diate. Although one might expect that the factor of immediacy would 
normally be present, there may be some circumstances where that need 
not be so. If, for instance, a particular abatement schedule permitted 
chemical discharge levels that would probably, over a period of time, 
render marine life commonly harvested from the polluted waters unfit 
for human consumption, it is submitted that a court would be justi-
fied in requiring the revision of the abatement schedule to eliminate 
the existing long-range danger, even though the full impact of the 
discharges might not be felt for several years. 
It should be no defense to a petition alleging damage to the environ-
ment that the respondent is a political subdivision of the Common-
wealth. The court hearing the petition is empowered to restrain the 
"person" causing or about to cause environmental damage. The Gen-
eral Laws provide that the construction of person in any statute shall 
include, in addition to individuals, "corporations, societies, associa-
tions, and partnerships."5 The Supreme Judicial Court has held that 
5 G.L., c. 4, §7 (23). 
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the statutory construction of person ordinarily does not include the 
Commonwealth or any political subdivision.6 However, in Attorney 
General v. City of Woburn,? a special statute authorizing the attor-
ney general to obtain an injunction against "whoever" polluted a 
river in Woburn was construed to permit injunctive relief against the 
city for discharging sewage and other waste into the river. Given the 
legislature's clear intention to permit general enforcement of environ-
mental laws and the specific inclusion· in the scope of "damage to the 
envjronment" of such predominantly municipal violations as "im-
proper sewage disposal" and "improper operation of dumping 
grounds," a forceful argument can be made that a municipality should 
be construed as a "person" for the purposes of the new law. Further-
more, municipalities should enjoy no immunity from private enforce-
ment of laws and regulations which would be enforced against them 
by the appropriate public authorities. Construing person broadly so 
as to include political subdivisions is reasonable, for such a construc-
tion will not subject political subdivisions to new regulations but will 
merely make their compliance with existing regulations more likely. 
Cases holding that person does not embrace political subdivisions are 
generally distinguishable on the ground that they involve situations 
where the contrary holding would have created new financial or other 
restrictive obligations upon governmental entities. No new obliga-
tions would be created were Section lOA held to apply to political 
subdivisions. 
§8.5. Remedies. After determining whether there has been or is 
about to be "damage to the environment" under G.L., c. 214, §10A, 1 
but before the final determination of the case, the court may restrain 
the person causing or about to cause the damage. Clearly the court 
may order the complete cessation of pollution or may sanction its 
continuance upon immediate action by the pollutor to lessen his dis-
charge. A court would also have the power, within the normal limits 
of general equitable principles, to direct the offender to repair the 
damage he had caused. 
A finding by the court in favor of petitioners allows the court to im-
pose their expenses upon the respondent, exclusive of damages and 
attorneys' fees. This limitation on the relief granted is clearly intended 
to prevent "strike suits" and is another indication of the legislature's 
intent to benefit public rather than private interests. It is still possible 
to. recover damages under a separate cause of action, however, since 
the last part of the statute provides: 
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed so as to 
impair, derogate or diminish any common law or statutory right 
or remedy which may be available to any person, but the cause 
6 Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962); Mrugala v. City of 
Boston, 330 Mass. 707, 115 N.E.2d 148 (1953). 
7 322 Mass. 634,79 N.E.2d 187 (1948). 
§8.5. 1 Actsofl97l,c.732,§1. 
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of action herein authorized shall be in addition to any such right 
or remedy.2 
B. STATUTORY RIGHT OF INTERVENTION 
§8.6. Right of intervention in adjudicatory proceedings. Section 
lOA of G.L., c. 30A states: 
[N]ot less than ten persons may intervene in any adjudicatory pro-
ceeding as defined in [G.L., c. 30A, §1], in which damage to the 
environment as defined in [G.L., c. 214, §lOA], is or might be at 
issue; provided, however, that such intervention shall be limited 
to the issue of damage to the environment and the elimination or 
reduction thereof in order that any decision in such proceeding 
shall include the disposition of such issue. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of [Chapter 30A], any intervenor under this sec-
tion may introduce evidence, present witnesses and make written 
or oral argument, except that the agency may exclude repetitive 
or irrelevant material. Any such intervenor shall be considered a 
party to the original proceeding for the purposes of notice and 
any other procedural rights .applicable to such proceeding under 
the provisions of [Chapter 30A], including specifically the right 
of appeal. 1 
Section lOA is intended to permit active citizen participation in admin-
istrative hearings in which damage to the environment might be in 
issue. It is hoped that diligent citizen intervention and responsive-
ness on the part of the appropriate agency will make recourse to the 
courts unnecessary. Perhaps inadvertently, this ·section does not ex-
plicitly sanction intervention by cities and towns. Under Section 10 
of Chapter 30A, however, cities and towns have been permitted to 
intervene without explicit statutory grounds when questions of con-
cern to their inhabitants are raised in an adjudicatory proceeding.2 
Presumably a similar conclusion will be reached with respect to Section 
lOA. 
Intervention is allowed only in "adjudicatory proceedings," which 
include proceedings in which an administrative hearing is required 
by constitutional or other statutory provisions to determine the legal 
rights, duties, or privileges of specifically named persons.3 The right 
of intervention thus does not extend to the ordinary rule-making pro-
ceeding.4 
Intervention is limited to the question of environmental damage 
2 Ibid. 
§8.6. 1 Actsofl97l,c.732,§2. 
2 Sudbury v: Department of Public Utils., 351 Mass. 214, 218 N.E.2d 415 (1966); Wil-
mington v. Department of Public Utils., 340 Mass. 432, 165 N.E.2d 99 (1960). 
3 G.L., c. 30A,§l(l). 
4 Westland Housing Corp. v. Commissioner of Insurance, 352 Mass. 374, 377-380, 225 
N.E.2d 782, 785-787 (1967). 
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"in order that any decision in such proceeding shall include the dis-
position of Sl1Ch issue." Read literally, the above quoted language 
indicates that intervention would be permitted only for the purpose of 
pointing out that an environmental damage issue exists. Such a nar-
row interpretation is not consistent, however, with the general rights 
afforded to such intervenors to participate in the hearing and to have 
the status of a party to the proceedings. A reading more consistent with 
legislative intent would provide that upon the introduction of proof 
by the intervenors that environmental damage is or might be at issue, 
the agency proceedings must be expanded to include argument on, 
and agency consideration of, that issue. Furthermore, the agency's 
decision must dispose of the issue explicitly by appropriate action, 
either by determining that the issue is not involved in the proceedings 
or by deciding the issue on the merits (either decision being open to 
appeal on the part of the intervenors as a consequence of their general 
right to appeal). 
C. OIL POLLUTION 
§8. 7. The federal scheme. In response to oil spill disasters such as 
the Torrey Canyon incident off England and the Santa Barbara Chan-
nel spill, 1 Congress included in the Water Quality Improvement Act 
of 19702 comprehensive federal legislation with respect to oil pol-
h.ition.3 In the act, Congress declared: "[I]t is the policy of the United 
States that there should be no discharges of oil into or upon the 
navigable waters of the United States .... "4 Congress defined oil 
quite broadly,5 but in the substantive provisions of the legislation 
prohibited only discharges of oil in "harmful quantities"-with 
certain exceptions.6 Congress instructed the president to determine by 
regulation the quantities of oil that were harmful to public health or 
welfare/ and specifically required the determination of "harmful 
quantities" with respect to shellfish, wildlife, public or private prop-
erty, shoreline, or beaches.8 Harmful quantities has been defined by 
regulation as discharges of oil that violate applicable water quality 
standards or that cause a film, sheen, or discoloration on the water 
§8.7. 1 See ll5 Cong. Rec. 9015-9052, 9259-9293, 29,046-29,102, 28,947-29,008 (1969), 
116 Cong. Rec. 8975-9008 (1970) (House and Senate debates on the Water Quality Im-
provement Act) [hereinafter cited as Debates]; see particularly ll5 Cong. Rec. 29,095 
( 1969) (statement of Senator Kennedy) and 115 Cong. Rec. 9020-9021 (1969) (statement of 
Representative Cramer). 
2 Pub. L. No. 91-224, §§101-ll2, 84 Stat. 91. The sections of the Water Quality Im-
provement Act that pertain to oil pollution are codified in 33 U.S.C. §ll61. 
3 33 u.s.c. §1161. 
4Jd. §116l(b)(l). 
5 Id. §116l(a)(l), which defines oil as "oil of any kind or in any form, including, but 
not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other 
than dredged spoil." 
6 Id. §ll6l(b)(2)(A), which permits "discharges into the waters of the contiguous zone, 
where permitted under article IV of the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended. " 
7 Id. §116l(b)(2)(B). 
8 Id. §116l(b)(3). 
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surface or adjoining shoreline, or sludge deposits beneath the water 
or on the adjoining shoreline.9 The owner or operator of a vessel or 
of an onshore or offshore facility from which oil is knowingly dis-
charged in violation of the federal statute is subject to a civil penalty 
of $10,000, to be assessed by the commander of the Coast Guard dis-
trict in which the spill occurrs. 10 In addition, such owner or opera-
tor, except under certain circumstances, is liable to the United States 
for the actual costs of removing the oil discharged.ll The maximum 
liability is limited as follows: (a) for vessels, $100 per gross ton of 
ship displacement or $14,000,000, whichever is less; 12 and (b) for 
onshore and offshore facilities, $8,000,000. 13 If the discharge is caused 
by the act of a third person, he is liable to the United States for the 
cost of oil removal and is subject to roughly the same limits of liabil-
ity.14 In any event, the removal is to be accomplished in accordance 
with a national contingency plan for the removal of oil spills. 15 The 
limits of liability noted above do not apply where the discharge is the 
result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within the privity 
or knowledge of the owner, in which case there is no limit to the 
liability of the owner or operator for cleanup costs. 16 The secretary 
of the Department of the Interior may, by regulation, set lower limits of 
liability for onshore facilities that do not present a substantial risk of 
oil discharge.'7 It is not clear whether a court would impose un-
limited liability on an operator for a spill caused by willful negli-
9 18 C.F.R. §610.3 (1971). Exceptions are pro\'ided for discharges from properly func-
tioning vessel engines, certain demonstration projects, and as permitted in the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, as amended. 
Id. §§610.5, 610.6, 610.8. Other provisions of the convention were implemented in 33 U .S.C. 
§§1001-1015, ll61(b)(2)(A). 
Massachusetts water quality standards allow no oil whatsoever in the waters of the 
state or allow it only in such amounts as result from waste treatment facilities providing 
appropriate treatment. Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, Water Quality Stan-
dards (filed March 6, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Water Quality Standards]. It must there-
fore be assumed that all oil spills in state waters will be of "harmful quantities" of oil 
as defined by Massachusetts and hence in violation of the state water pollution standards, 
whether or not federal standards are violated. 
10 The statute places the responsibility of assessing civil penalties on the secretary of 
the department under which the Coast Guard is operating, currently the Department of 
Transportation. 33 U.S.C. §116l(b)(5). The authority to assess civil penalties has been 
delegated to the various Coast Guard district commanders. 33 C.F.R. §153.03(b)(l) (1971). 
It should be noted that port clearance for vessels whose owners or operators have been 
assessed with a fine for polluting may be withheld until the fine is paid. 33 U.S.C. 
§116l(b)(5); 19 C.F.R. §4.66a (1971). 
11 33 U.S.C. §1161(£); the excepted circumstances are spills resulting from an act of 
God, act of war, negligence on the part of the United States, or the act of a third party, 
whether negligent or not. It is not clear who is to bear the liability where a nonnegligent 
act of the United States caused an oil spill. 
12 Id. §1161(f)( I). 
13 Id. §§116l(f)(2), (3). 
14 Id. §ll6l(g). 
15 §1161(c). The national contingency plan has been published: Council on En-
vironmental Quality, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 
Plan (Aug. 1971). 
16 33 u.s.c. §§116l(f)(l)-(3). 
17 Id.§ll6l(f)(l). 
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gence within the knowledge of the owner but not within the privity 
or·knowledge of the operator. 
In order to enable the United States to take prompt and effective 
steps to ensure that oil spills are removed, the statute requires that the 
person in control of the source of an oil spill immediately notify the 
appropriate federal agency of the spill.I8 In general, the appropriate 
agency for spills in coastal waters is the Coast Guard; for spills in 
inland waters, the Environmental Protection Agency. 19 Failure to 
give immediate notice subjects the person in control of the pollution 
source to a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment of up to one 
year.2° If gross pollution from a vessel is threatened, as would be the 
case if a vessel such as the Torrey Canyon were involved, the statute 
provides that the vessel may be removed or destroyed by the govern-
ment.21 
All vessels and barges that are in excess of 300 gross tons and use 
the waters or ports of the United States must establish and maintain 
evidence of financial responsibility of $100 per gross ton or $14 million, 
whichever is less, to meet their potential liability to the United States 
under any provision of the oil pollution legislation.22 The evidence 
required may be supplied by evidence of insurance, by surety bonds, 
by qualification as a self-insurer, or otherwise; where one owner 
possesses a fleet of vessels, the requirement of evidence of financial 
responsibility is limited to the maximum liability of the largest vessel 
in the fleet. 23 
Probably no other aspects of the federal legislation received so much 
attention or were so controversial as those dealing with financial 
responsibility and limits of liability.24 The Senate version of the 
legislation provided that liability for the removal of oil discharged 
would be limited to $125 per gross ton, with a maximum liability of 
$14 million;25 the House bill called for $100 and $10 million, respec-
tively.26 There seems little doubt that the lower limit of liability in 
the House bill was set at the behest of American shipping and British 
insurance interests, both of whom argued that insurance in excess of 
the limits set by the House bill would be unattainable, and that dam-
ages paid as a result of unlimited liability could bankrupt vessel 
owners, among others.27 That a higher maximum limit was ultimate-
ly adopted, apparently without preventing the affected vessel owners 
18 Id. §1161(b)(4). 
19 Exec. Order No.11,548, 3 C.F.R. 151 (Comp. 1970); 33 C.F.R. §153.105 (1971). 
20 33 u.s.c. §116l(b)(4). 
21 Id. §1161(d). 
22 ld. §1161(p)(1). 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Debates, n.1 supra. 
25 S. 7, 91stCong., 2dSess. (1970). 
26 H. 4148, 91stCong., 2dSess. (1970). 
27 The contentions of the shipping industry are aired in 115 Cong. Rec. 29,048 (1969) 
(statement of Senator Muskie) and 115 Cong. Rec. 9020-9021 (1969) (statement of Repre-
sentative Cramer). 
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from acquiring the required insurance or bonds, belies the arguments 
advanced by those special interests.28 With supertankers well in 
excess of 200,000 gross tons operating today, and with costs for clean-
up operations running as high as $118 per gross ton in the case of the 
Torrey Canyon, 29 it is obvious that the potential cleanup costs of a 
major oil spill could easily exceed the maximum limits on liability 
established by the legislation. Once it is accepted that those who cause 
oil spills must bear the cost of removing the polluting oil, there seems 
very little reason to put any limit on the liability for cleanup costs. It 
is conceded by the shipping industry that, barring those few instances 
of natural disaster that are excepted in the section, oil spills are uni-
versally the result of negligence.30 Therefore, any liability for cleanup 
costs would be accompanied by negligence on the part of the trans-
porter. The risk that financial hardship or bankruptcy might result 
from the liability of an underinsured shipowner or operator for clean-
up costs can be forestalled if shipowners will carry adequate insurance. 
The act authorizes the president to remove the oil discharged into 
navigable waters of the United States unless he determines that the 
owner or operator responsible for the discharge will do so.31 The 
president is charged with the responsibility of preparing and main-
taining a national contingency plan that provides for the coordinated 
containment, removal, and dispersal of discharged oil, and the mini-
mization of the damage caused by the oil. As part of the plan, the presi-
dent is to assign duties among various agencies, provide for appropriate 
equipment, establish an adequately trained and equipped cleanup 
strike force, provide for a surveillance system, establish a national 
coordinating center, and identify appropriate techniques for contain-
ing, removing, and dispersing spills.32 The president is also charged 
with the responsibility of issuing regulations that are consistent with 
the plan and that set forth procedures for removing discharged oil, 
establishing local and regional contingency plans, establishing pro-
cedures to prevent offshore oil spills, and establishing procedures 
governing the inspection of vessels to reduce the likelihood of oil 
spills.33 Violation of the federal regulations subjects the owner or 
operator to a $5000 fine, which may be assessed and compromised by 
the president.34 The president has delegated his responsibilities 
under the act variously to the Secretaries of Interior and Transpor-
tation, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Council on Environ-
28 It was predicted at the time that the maritime insurance industry would quickly 
adjust to any limit on liability set by Congress, or, indeed, to a complete lack of liability. 
Letter of Allan I. Mendelsohn to Senator Muskie, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 29,049 
(1969). Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. I 
(1969). 
29 115 Cong. Rec. 29,048 (1969) (statement of Senator Muskie). 
3° Id. at28,954(statementofSenator Muskie). 
31 33 U.S.C. §ll61(c)(1). 
32 Id. §1161(c)(2). 
33 Id. §1161(j)(1). 
34 Id. §116l(j) (2). 
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mental Quality, and the administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency.35 Pursuant to its delegated authority, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality prepared a national contingency plan, which was 
published in June 1970. The original plan was superseded by another 
plan published by the council in July 1971. A revolving fund of $35 
million, which is to be supplemented by all sums collected by the 
United States under the provisions of the act, was established to carry 
out the national contingency plan.36 The appropriations for the fund 
were also a subject of compromise in Congress, with the Senate bill 
calling for a fund of $50 million37 and the House bill for $20 million.38 
There are other federal acts relating to pollution control, viz., the 
Refuse Act of 189939 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1961,40 the latter 
of which was enacted to implement the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954.41 The Refuse 
Act prohibits the discharging of refuse matter into the navigable 
waters of the United States without a permit from the Army Corps of 
Engineers.42 It is well established that refuse matter includes oil,43 
and that no permits are to be issued by the Army Corps of Engineers 
for discharges of oil in harmful quantities.44 Violations of the Refuse 
Act give rise to both civil and criminal actions: injunctive relief is 
available to prevent the continuance of discharges or the potential 
of future discharges,45 and criminal penalties for violations of the 
act include fines of $500 to $2500 and a maximum of one year imprison-
ment per violation.46 Vessels are liable in proceedings in rem for fines 
levied against them, and officers of vessels knowingly violating the 
act may have their license revoked or suspended.47 In the case of a 
corporate defendant, criminal penalties also attach to responsible 
corporate officers for violations of the act and have been so imposed 
in recent antipollution actions.48 The number of oil spill cases 
35 Exec. Order No. 11,548,3 C.F.R. 151 (Comp. 1970). 
36 33 u.s.c. §116l(k). 
37 S. 7, 9lst Cong., 2dSess. (1970). 
38 H. 4148, 9lstCong., 2dSess. (1970). 
39 33 U.S.C. §401 et seq. 
40 Id. §§1001 etseq. 
41 May29, 1961,(1961]2U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900. 
42 33 u.s.c. §407. 
43 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Ballard 
Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952); La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936). 
44 33 C.F.R. §209.13l(d)(ll)(ii) (1972). It may well be that industries using significant 
amounts of oil will be required to take precautions to prevent leakage or spillage of 
such oil in order to obtain discharge permits from the Army Corps of Engineers pursu-
ant to Exec. Order No. II, 574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (Comp. 1970). The requiring of such pre-
cautions would appear to be consistent with the corps' regulations. 33 C.F.R. §§209.131 
(c)(l), 209.13l(d)(5)-(9), 209.13l(d)(ll) (1972). 
4
' Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901). Injunctive relief is also available under 
the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §II6l(c). 
46 33 U .S.C. §411. One interesting aspect of the penalty provisions is that one-half 
of any fine assessed is to be paid to persons giving information leading to the conviction 
of the discharger. 
47 1d. §412. 
48 E.g., United States v. ]. ]. O'Donnell Woolens, Inc. and ]. ]. O'Donnell, Sr., 
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brought under the Refuse Act, 49 despite the existence of a predeces-
sor50 to the Water Quality Improvement Act, indicates the versatility 
of the Refuse Act as an enforcement tool, and illustrates as well the 
more limited usefulness of the predecessor of 33 U.S.C. §1161. With 
the passage of the federal Water Quality Improvement Act and its 
more effective civil remedies, the use of the Refuse Act in connection 
with oil pollution control can be expected to diminish. However, 
since the Refuse Act makes dischargers criminally liable and since it 
is enforceable directly by the Justice Department, the act should have 
a continuing role in pollution abatement actions. 
The Oil Pollution Act of 19615 1 is more narrow in scope than 
the Refuse Act. Enacted to implement an international convention, it 
forbids the discharge of oil from ships within 50 miles of the seacoast, 52 
with several exceptions.53 The legislation is criminal in nature and 
provides penalties comparable to those provided in the Refuse Act. 54 
Enforcement of the act is aided by making ships liable in actions in 
rem for any fine levied under the act and denying them clearance from 
United States ports until such penalties are paid.55 The licenses of 
masters and officers of offending ships may also be suspended or 
revoked.56 As an additional enforcement aid, ships are required to 
keep oil logs noting operations in which discharge of oil may occur .57 
There have been no cases reported yet under this act. 
§8.8. The Massachusetts scheme. The Massachusetts Clean 
Waters Act1 deals, inter alia, with both onshore and offshore oil pol-
Crim. No. 71-221-G (D. Mass., Nov. 17, 1971), in which Mr. O'Donnell and his cor-
poration, which had allegedly discharged refuse matter (other than oil) into navigable 
waters in violation of the Refuse Act, were both charged with criminal violations. Both 
entered pleas of nolo contendere, and both were fined $500 on each of five counts. 
<9 33 U.S.C. §§401 et seq. 
5° Former 33 U.S.C. §§431 et seq. 
51 33 U.S.C. §§1001 etseq. 
52Jd. §§1002,1011. 
53 The exceptions to the act's prohibition against the discharge of oil from ships are: 
(I) when a ship other than a tanker is proceeding to a port not provided with facilities 
adequate for reception, without causing undue delay, it may discharge such residues and 
oily mixtures as would remain for disposal if the bulk of the water had been separated 
from the mixture, provided such discharge is made as far as practicable from land (id. 
§1002(b)); (2) if, in the opinion of the master, special circumstances make it neither 
reasonable or practicable to retain the oil or oily mixture on board, it may be discharged 
outside the prohibited zones (id. §1002(c)); (3) when discharge of oil or oily mixtures 
is necessary to secure the safety of a ship, prevent damage to ship or cargo, or to save life 
at sea (id. §1003(a); (4) when the escape of oil or of oily mixtures is the result of damage 
to a ship or unavoidable leakage (id. §1003(b); (5) when the discharge is the result of puri-
fication or clarification of fuel oil or lubricating oil, provided that such discharge is made 
as far from land as practicable (id. §1003(c)); (6) the act does not apply to the discharge 
from the bilges of a ship of an oily mixture containing no oil other than lubricating oil 
that has drained or leaked from machinery spaces (id. §1004). 
54 Id. §1005. 
55 Ibid. 
56 33 u.s.c. §1006. 
57 ld. §1008. 
§8.8. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 685, §I, inserting G .L., c. 21, §§26-53. 
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lution. The Division of Water Pollution Control of the Department 
of Natural Resources is responsible for containing and removing oil 
spills and determining the persons liable for violation of the act. 2 The 
act provides that chemicals may not be used in oil removal unless they 
have been approved by the division,3 and under the legislation pollu-
ters are made liable to the state for costs incurred by the division in 
investigating, containing, and removing an oil spill, and to third 
persons for any damage to their real and personal property.4 Criminal 
penalties are also p,rovided: a fine of up to $10,000 for ea~h day the 
violation continues, or imprisonment for up to two years for each spill, 
or both. All recovered costs and fines are to be credited to an account 
from which may be appropriated amounts for financing the further in-
vestigation, containment, and removal of oil spills.5 The act imposes 
a fine of up to $5000 on the owner or operator of a potential oil pol-
lution source, who, as soon as he has knowledge of a spill from such 
source, fails to notify the director of the division immediat~ly.6 The act 
also provides for the licensing of all terminals loading oil onto or 
discharging oil from vessels.7 The division is authorized to promul-
gate and enforce rules and regulations for prevention of oil spills, is 
required to inspect periodically equipment used in marine terminal 
operations, and may order the replacement of defective equipment.8 
Acting under this authority, the director has issued regulations,9 the 
scope of which includes (a) the contents of the pretransfer agreement 
between vessel and terminal personnel regarding transfer operations, 
precautions to be taken in vessel and terminal operation during trans-
fer, and procedures regarding the use and care of transfer hoses; 10 (b) 
the selection of sites for oil terminals, the design and adequacy of their 
drainage systems, and the diking of oil storage tanks; 11 and (c) pro-
cedures to be followed on the occurrence of an oil spill, including 
prompt notification of the division, and a requirement that the person 
responsible for the spill take immediate steps to stop any continuing 
discharge and to contain and remove the oil from the waters of the 
Commonwealth. 12 
Oil terminal and wharf owners and operators are required to employ 
2 G.L., c. 21, §27(10). 
3 Ibid. Approved chemicals are listed in Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, Use of 
Chemicals, Materials or Techniques to Treat Oil Spills (Pub. No. 5394, 1970). 
4 G.L., c. 21, §27(10). 
5 Ibid. In addition, oil spills that violate water quality standards are punishable by 
fines of up to $1000 for each day they continue. G.L., c. 21, §42. 
6 ld. §27(10). 
7 Id. §50. 
8 Ibid. See also the provisions for licensing of marinas by the division, G.L., c. 91, 
§59 B. 
9 Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, Rules for the Prevention and Control of Oil 
Pollution in the Waters of the Commonwealth (filed June 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as 
Regulations). 
1o Regulations §§4.0lto 4.04. 
u Id. §§5.0lto5.04. 
121d.§§7.01to7.05. 
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trained crews and to acquire floating booms capable of encircling 
ships engaged in loading or unloading oil. The crews are apparently 
required to lay the booms around the ship transferring oil whenever 
there is a spill, and to remove the oil so contained before the ship can 
proceed. 13 The language of the provision is not a model of clarity. 
Although the provision requires the employment of a "trained crew," 
it neglects to mention for what the crew is to be trained. From the con-
text of the words used, it appears that the crew is to be trained in the 
control of oil pollution, or, at a minimum, in the use of the required 
boom in the entrapment and removal of spilled oil. That the crew must 
actually position the boom to contain a spill is only implied by the 
provision of the act that empowers the director to order the owner or 
operator of a terminal or wharf, when such person is found by the 
director to have negligently caused oil pollution, to encircle with a 
boom every ship discharging oil. 14 The implication and the provi-
sion are weakened by the failure of the act to provide for spills caused 
by the negligence of the ship's owner or its crew, and by the failure of 
the act to empower the director to order the encirclement of ships load-
ing oil in cases where there has been as yet no oil spilled. 
Operating an unlicensed terminal is punishable by a fine of $100 per 
day, and violations of the section regarding the containment and re-
moval of oil are punishable by fines of up to $1000 per day and the 
revocation of terminal licenses. 15 The act also provides that all ves-
sels, including barges, discharging or receiving cargoes of oil in the 
Commonwealth must post a bond in favor of the Commonwealth in 
the amount of $25,000, or otherwise satisfy the division that they are 
financially responsible. If oil "is discharged into the waters of the Com-
monwealth from a vessel, its bond is forfeited to the extent of the costs 
incurred by the division in containing and removing the oil. A vessel 
violating the provisions of the section is subject to a fine of up to 
$5000. 16 
The regulatory provisons applying to vessels must be read together 
with sections subjecting persons discharging oil into the waters of 
the Commonwealth to a fine of not more than $100017 and to double 
damages in an action in tort for property damage caused by the oil. 18 
The personal liability and double damages provisions are for some 
reason codified in the chapter dealing with public ways and works 
rather than in the chapter dealing with the Department of Natural 
Resources. Liability under the provisions is limited to discharges 
which cause pollution, contamination, nuisance, or a potential injury 
13 G.L., c. 21, §50A provides: "(The director] shall require every such owner or opera-
tor to encircle every ship or vessel depositing oil at his wharf or terminal with such a 
boom." 
14 Ibid. 
15 G.L., c. 21, §§50, 50A. Licenses for oil terminals are to be renewed annually. Regu-
lations §8.03. 
16 G.L., c. 21, §SOB. 
"G.L., c. 91, §59. 
18 I d. §59A. 
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to the public health. It can be assumed that discharges which cause 
violations of state water quality standards cause pollution within the 
meaning of the personal liability and double damages provisions. 
Since Massachusetts water quality standards allow no oil in or on the 
waters of the Commonwealth or allow oil only in such quantities as 
may result from discharges from appropriate waste treatment facil-
ities,19 it can also be assumed that all oil spills will constitute viola-
tions of these sections. To the extent that the Massachusetts statute 
would impose liability without recognizing the exceptions provided 
by the federal Water Quality Improvement Act, e.g., exceptions for 
spills resulting from an act of God, act of war, negligence on the part 
of the United States, or the act of a third party, whether negligent or 
not,2o its constitutionality is questionable.21 
It should be noted that another set of statutes, codified in the chapter 
dealing with marine fish and fisheries, governs discharges of oil that 
injure fish. 22 These statutes prohibit the discharge of oil and other 
substances into coastal waters if such discharge could materially in-
jure fish, either directly or by affecting their reproduction cycle, under 
penalty of a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment of up to one year.23 
A person causing damage to fisheries by such discharge is also liable 
to the city or town whose fisheries were injured and to any person 
having fishery rights therein for double damages in tort. 24 
§8.9. Comment. The national contingency plan places primary 
responsibility for containing and removing oil spills on state or 
regional agencies, federal intervention not being required except in 
the event of major spills.1 Since the state Division of Water Pollution 
Control is capable of handling most spills and since Massachusetts 
has happily not experienced a major spill since the passage of the 
federal legislation, governmental response to oil spills in the Com-
monwealth has come from the division rather than from federal agen-
cies.2 Since the federal program does not underwrite the costs of state 
19 Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, Water Quality Standards (filed March 6, 
1967). 
2o 33 U.S.C. §ll6l(f). 
21 In American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971), 
a three-judge district court held unconstitutional a Florida statute imposing unlimited 
strict liability on onshore facilities and offshore vessels and facilities for cleanup costs 
or damages resulting from oil spills in the navigable waters of Florida. The Florida act 
had recognized none of the defenses contained in the federal legislation. Since Massachu-
setts does not explicitly recognize the defenses noted in the federal legislation, the Mas-
sachusetts statute may be subject to constitutional attack on the same grounds. 
22 G.L.,c.l30,§§22-27. 
2' Id. §23. 
24 Id. §24. 
§8.9. 1 Council on Environmental Quality, National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan §§2020.1, 2020.2 (1971). 
2 Statement by Donald L. Corey, supervising sanitary engineer, Mass. Div. of Water 
Pollution Control [hereinafter cited as Corey], noted in Transcript of Proceedings at the 
Third Enforcement Conference of the Environmental Protection Agency Relating to 
Boston Harbor 317-325 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Boston Harbor Transcript]. The 
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programs (the national contingency plans calls for a federal response 
to oil spills in those states without agencies capable of responding to 
oil spills), there is some dissatisfaction on the state level with the struc-
ture of the federal program. 3 
Upon notification of an oil spill, the initial reaction of the respond-
ing agency, whether federal or state, normally is to attempt to persuade 
the discharger to cease discharging and to take immediate steps him-
~df to contain and remove the oil. 4 To this end the agency offers 
technical and procedural advice as to the best methods of containment 
and removal. Since the alternative is removal by state or federal agen-
cies, with a charge back of costs to the discharger and possible criminal 
action, voluntary compliance by the polluter is the usual case and is 
estimated to occur in 90 percent of all cases. 5 The extent of voluntary 
compliance is indicated by the fact that the state has spent only 
$250,000 on cleanup of oil spills during the past three years, while the 
estimated total cost for cleanup of oil spills in the state was between 
$1 and $2 million annually. 6 In the event that the discharger does not 
immediately take adequate steps to terminate the discharge, the 
responding agency will usually seek appropriate injunctive relief. 
If the discharger does not take immediate steps to contain and remove 
the discharged oil, the responding agency will normally contract 
the job to a specialized oil removal firm. Upon completion of the 
cleanup, the agency will initiate legal action to recover the costs and 
to seek criminal penalties where appropriate. 
Enforcement procedures aepend upon initial notification of the 
appropriate agency that an oil spill has occurred. Both federal and 
state legislation require the person in charge of the polluting facility 
to give such notice, under threat of criminal penalties. The vessel at 
sea poses particularly difficult enforcement problems because the 
detection of bilge or ballast water discharges is virtually impossible if 
the vessel is able to put sufficient distance between itself and the dis-
charge before the spill is observed.7 Fear of prosecution is a relatively 
minor deterrent in such instances. Detection of discharges from sta-
tionary sources also may be difficult at times; the tracing to its origin 
of an oil slick on a river, if there are several possible upstream dis-
chargers and the slick is not promptly detected, imposes impossible 
division understands that "[f]ederal agencies will not normally be involved in super-
vision or clean-up of small to moderate oil pollution incidents ... [but] will be directly 
involved in any major oil pollution incident." Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, 
Use of Chemicals, Materials or Techniques to Treat Oil Spills (Pub. No. 5394, 1970). 
3 Statement by Corey, noted in Boston Harbor Transcript 322. 
4 Council on Environmental Quality, National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollu-
tion Contingency Plan §§504.2, 504.3 (1971); Mass. Div. of Water Pollution Control, 
Rules for the Prevention and Control of Oil Pollution in the Waters of the Common-
wealth §§7.01, 7.02 (filed June 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]. 
5 Statement by Corey, noted in Boston Harbor Transcript 321. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Such discharges are within the category of those prohibited. Regulations §3.03. But 
see 33 U.S.C. §§1002(b), 1003. 
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problems. Vigorous prosecution of dischargers who fail to report 
spills is necessary to accomplish fully the goals of both state and 
federal legislation. Since the number of probable oil discharges is 
relatively small, word of prosecution can be expected to spread quickly. 
Furthermore, since liability for failure to report spills is personal 
rather than corporate, the incentive for persons in charge of opera-
tions that result in spills to report the pollution would be great if 
the risk of criminal prosecution were real. 
The major point of operational difficulty between the federal and 
state pollution prevention programs relates to financial responsibility 
requirements. Federal law makes oil polluters liable to the United 
States for costs incurred by it in the removal of oil and requires vessels 
to evidence financial responsibility, by bond or otherwise, to meet 
such liability. At the same time, the federal government expects the 
state to bear the responsibility for dealing with most oil spills. Federal 
law, however, has no provision regarding the liability of oil polluters 
to the state for its costs in the removal of oil; even if such liability 
otherwise exists, federal law does not provide that the bonds or insur-
ance required by vessels as evidence of their financial responsibility 
will be available to meet the liability of such vessels to the state. Thus 
if states wish to be reimbursed for their costs they must, as Massachu-
setts has done, enact legislation with respect to reimbursement and 
financial responsibility or bonding of vessels. A financial responsibility 
requirement, however, creates difficulties for the state and shipowners 
alike. Conscientious administration of such a program detracts from 
the limited manpower available to the division for the prevention of 
pollution and the enforcement of pollution control laws. The neces-
sity of maintaining bonds that satisfy both federal and state authorities 
may cause confusion, duplicated expense, and much paperwork for 
ship owners. Foreign flag vessels that do not call frequently at Mas-
sachusetts ports are especially burdened by the new financial re-
sponsibility requirements. Some foreign vessels, unaware of the local 
bonding requirement, have been forced to stand off Massachusetts 
waters until the requirements have been met. The obvious confusion, 
frustration, and expense created by the state bonding requirement has 
raised the fear that some vessels would refuse to call at Massachusetts 
ports, particularly when other ports in the vicinity are free of bonding 
requirements. If this fear is realized, it could contribute to the decline 
of the state's ports. On the other hand, it may be argued that once 
shippers are aware of the separate bonding requirements, the confusion 
and frustration will dissipate. The necessity for two bonding require-
ments could easily be removed by amending 33 U.S.C. §ll6l(p) to pro-
vide that bonds or insurance used to meet the federal requirement of 
financial responsibility could be used to meet liabilities to the states 
for expenses incurred in containing and removing spills.8 It should 
8 It should be noted that the original House bill provided that funds recovered by 
the United States under the legislation and added to the revolving fund for oil spill clean-
up were to be "available to reimburse a State or political subdivision thereof that assists 
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be noted that Representative Wright, one of the authors of the House 
bill, observed the following with respect to bonds used to satisfy the 
federal financial responsibility requirements: 
[I]t would be my assumption that these assets, as any other assets 
owned by the firm or the individual involved, after the satisfaction 
of any claim to the Government would be liable to a judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction in a suit by a person damaged 
other than the Government.9 
Experience is too limited to indicate whether federal and state 
responses will be adequate to limit oil pollution to acceptable levels. 
The existing legislation appears to offer a sufficient vehicle to accom-
plish the objective. The primary question is whether the resources 
allocated to the job, in terms of money and manpower, are sufficient. 
Some progress has been noted, particularly in Boston Harbor where 
the chronic oil film has noticeably diminished as a result of oil terminal 
regulation and stricter policing of vessel discharges. 10 This is only a 
beginning, however, and must be expanded and improved upon if the 
stated national and local objectives are to be achieved. 
D. STuDENT CoMMENT 
§8.10. Inaction of town government in correcting source of water 
pollution: McMahon v. Town of Grafton. 1 For decades public 
health officials, both state and federal, have expressed alarm over the 
deteriorating quality of the Blackstone River and its tributaries. Con-
sidered by some of these officials as one of the worst polluted rivers in 
the Commonwealth, it has been the subject of two enforcement con-
ferences conducted under the aegis of the federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Administration. 2 Because of the discharge of raw sewage from 
its municipal drainage system, the town of Grafton (hereinafter called 
the town) has been identified as a major polluter of the Blackstone 
in the removal of any discharged oil or matter." H. 4132, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §17(h)(l) 
(1970). Representative Monagan observed: "This provision serves to guarantee swift and 
effective remedial efforts since the affected States can undertake costly cleanup opera-
tions with the assurance that their expenditures will be reimbursed." 115 Cong. Rec. 
9290 (1969). These expectations, however, depended upon interpreting the word "assists" 
broadly to include those cases in which the United States took no part in cleanup activ-
ities, i.e., where state assistance, in effect, was merely to relieve the federal government of 
any involvement. A reading of the bill in its entirety, however, tends to cut against such 
a broad interpretation. 
•115 Cong. Rec. 9286 (1969). 
10 Statement by Corey, noted in Boston Harbor Transcript 318-322. 
§8.10. 1 Eq. No. 91356 (Suffolk Super. Ct., filed Mar. 24, 1970). At the time this 
action was commenced, Thomas C. McMahon was director of the Division of Water 
Pollution Control in the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources. 
2 Department of Health, Education, 'lnd Welfare, Proceedings, Conference on Pollu-
tion of the Interstate Waters of the Blackstone and Ten Mile Rivers and their Tributaries 
(Jan. 1965); Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Proceedings (Second 
Session) (May 1968). 
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River. Since 1946 it has been apparent to the town that the construc-
tion and installation of a sewerage system would be necessary to elimi-
nate the public health problem posed by the lack of a proper treat-
ment facility for Grafton's sanitary wastes. 3 
Increasing concern over the continued pollution of the Common-
wealth's waters prompted the 1966 enactment of the Massachusetts 
Clean Waters Act,4 which created the Division of Water Pollution 
Control (hereinafter called the division) within the Department of 
Natural Resources. The division was vested with the "duty and 
responsibility ... to enhance the quality and value of water resources 
and to establish a program for the prevention, control, and abatement 
of water pollution."5 In 1968, under the authority of the Clean 
Waters Act, the division entered a finding of facts and issued a con-
sent order regarding sanitary waste disposal by the town of Grafton. 
It was signed by the selectmen as representatives of the town and 
ordered the town to take steps to construct a sewerage system to elimi-
nate the alleged pollution of the Blackstone River. The system was to 
provide treatment in accordance with water quality standards promul-
gated by the division under legislative mandate. Pursuant to what was 
then Section 46 of the act,6 the consent order incorporated time limita-
tions for the various steps to be taken by the town, culminating in the 
completion of a municipal sewerage system by mid-1972. No judicial 
appeal was taken by the town, either as to the reasonableness of the 
timetable in the schedule or as to the division's authority to act in this 
matter. As of this writing the town has refused to comply with any 
aspect of the order, notwithstanding court decrees mandating affirma-
tive action by the town in compliance with the implementation 
schedule prescribed by the order. 
As a result of a suit filed by the division in Suffolk Superior Court, 
a final decree was entered in October 1970 by Judge Collins, 7 order-
ing the town to vote an appropriation of such funds as would be 
necessary to comply with the division's consent order. Subsequently, 
a town meeting article calling for such an appropriation was de-
feated. Further litigation resulted in a finding of contempt by Judge 
Lurie in April1971, whereby the town was fined $2000 for its contempt 
and was again ordered to comply. In his order, Judge Lurie cited 
Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson 8 for the proposition that the 
courts are not powerless to deal effectively with recalcitrant town 
meetings. The decision in Hudson, quoted extensively and with em-
3 In 1946 the town of Grafton submitted a report to the state Department of Public 
Health relative to the location of a sewage disposal plant in Grafton. 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 685, §1, amendingG.L., c. 21 by adding§§26-50. 
5 G.L., c. 21, §27. 
6 Now§44, as changed by Acts of 1970, c. 704. 
7 Under the provisions of G.L., c. 212, §2, the judges of the superior court system are 
assigned, in rotation, to sittings of the superior court in various locations. In the course 
of its progress in Suffolk Superior Court, the Grafton case was heard by Judges Collins, 
Lurie, and Brogna. 
8 315 Mass. 335,52 N.E.2d566 (1943). 
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phasis by Judge Lurie in this first contempt adjudication, evolved 
from a fact situation somewhat analogous to that presented in the 
instant case. In 1942 the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute 
whereby the Department of Public Health was vested with the task of 
protecting public water supplies. To that end, the department was 
empowered to order all public and private agencies maintaining such 
water supplies to provide whatever equipment and treatment the 
department deemed necessary for the protection of the public health 
during the course of the Second World War. After determining that 
the water supplied to the town of Hudson was inadequately treated, 
the department, pursuant to the provisions of the legislative directive, 
sent a notice to the town ordering it to chlorinate its water supply. 
Despite this order, town meeting articles providing for the appropria-
tion of money for such equipment did not pass. Faced with this 
defiance of the department's order, the Commonwealth brought suit 
in equity, as provided by the statute, to enforce the order against the 
town. 
The question presented to the Supreme Judicial Court in the Hud-
son case concerned the ability of a town to defy the orders of a state 
agency made in conformance with legislative policy. The defendant 
town argued that the Commonwealth and its courts were powerless 
to compel a town to discharge adjudicated duties by ordering its elec-
torate to vote in a particular manner. The Court responded to this 
assertion with a protracted and definitive statement delineating the 
relationship that exists between the Commonwealth as sovereign and 
its subordinate governmental units. In emphasizing the nature of this 
relationship, the Court stressed the fact that the entire concept of the 
town meeting process, here used by Hudson to thwart legislative man-
date, is subject to the paramount authority of the legislature and the 
courts. 
Instead of the jurisdiction of the courts being restricted by reason 
of difficulty in enforcing their decrees, as the defendants contend, 
the true principle is that a grant of jurisdiction to the courts 
carries with it every power necessary to enable them to enforce 
their decrees and make them completely effective.9 
Although admitting that the threat of being jailed for contempt-the 
traditional device for securing compliance with a decree in equity-
would be unavailing against a municipality, the Court did state that 
other remedies, such as contempt fines 10 and seizure of property of 
select town inhabitants, 11 could serve to effect compliance by defiant 
9 I d. at 346,52 N.E.2d at573. 
10 Id. at347, 52 N.E.2dat 574. 
11 Ibid., citing Opinion of the· Justices, 297 Mass. 582, 586-587, 9 N.E.2d 189, 191 
(1937). "In some of the New England states a peculiar doctrine with reference to munic-
ipal indebtedness prevails either by statute or by immemorial usage. According to this 
doctrine the property of the inhabitants of a municipality may be seized and applied 
against the corporate obligations in the event that the corporation is unable to pay its 
debts. This unique and drastic remedy does not seem to have been adopted elsewhere in 
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towns with an order issued by the Commonwealth. 
Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have seen fit to employ 
their equity powers against municipal corporations in furtherance 
of legislative objectives. Under circumstances analogous to those 
presented in the Grafton situation, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, in State v. Town of Goffstown, 12 held that the state was en-
titled to obtain a mandatory injunction to effect the compliance of 
the defendant town with an order of the New Hampshire Water Pollu-
tion Commission. In California a district court of appeals issued a 
writ of mandamus to compel a county agency to provide for a pound 
system and a program for the control of rabies. 13 Another example of 
the Hudson rationale can be found in City of Huntington v. State 
Water Commission, wherein the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals stated that 
in matters which do not concern the inhabitants of a munici-
pality alone but which are of state-wide interest or concern a mun-
icipality can be compelled to carry out the plans of the state and 
to perform the duties which it imposes.l4 
The power enunciated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Hudson 
finds its origin in the nature of the relationship that exists between 
the state, its courts, and defiant municipalities: "Plainly a town is in 
no position to defy its creator, the Commonwealth, or to attempt to 
nullify legislative mandates issued under the authority of the General 
Court."15 However, in the Grafton case the town has indeed pro-
ceeded to defy the legislative mandate of the Clean Waters Act, not-
withstanding the fact that the mandate has been reinforced by two 
court decrees. Despite Judge Lurie's extensive and emphatic references 
to Hudson, a special Grafton town meeting, called expressly for the 
purpose of placing the sewerage appropriation article before the elec-
torate for the eighth time, failed to vote the money. With this develop-
ment, the matter was again presented to the superior court for further 
proceedings on the issue of the town's continued contempt. In this 
second contempt adjudication the presiding judge took a somewhat 
surprising volte-face. While acknowledging the fact that the town 
stood before the court in contempt, Judge Brogna expressed his reluc-
tance to bring the full powers of contempt to bear "to compel the 
voters to vote in a particular manner." 16 Judge Brogna expressed his 
the United States and has in fact been expressly repudiated upon occasion." Coffin, 
Enforcement of Judgments Against Municipal Corporations, 17 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 226, 
235-236 ( 1939). . 
12 100 N.H. 131, 121 A.2d 317 (1956). "[A court] may use. its adequate and ample 
armory of equitable powers to enforce the principal provisions of any decree that it may 
issue .... " ld. at 135, 121 A.2d at 320. 
13 Department of Public Health v. Board of Supervisors, 171 Cal. App. 2d 99, 339 
P.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
14 137 W.Va. 786,800, 73 S.E.2d 833, 842 (1953). 
15 315 Mass. 335,345,52 N.E.2d566, 573 (1943). 
16 In re Contempt, Eq. No. 91356 (Suffolk Super. Ct., July 13, 1971) (interim decree). 
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opinion that the legislature, in passing the Clean Waters Act, probably 
did not intend that the act should present the courts with the problem 
of dealing with defiant towns. He suggested that the attorney general 
seek to enforce the goals of the act by employing methods other than 
enforcement in equity. In this regard he mentioned resort to the 
criminal sanctions of the act17 and use of the health emergency ex-
ceptions to the prescribed method of municipal expenditures. 18 Final 
resolution of the issue of the town's continued contempt was deferred 
so as to give the attorney general time to explore various means of 
enforcement. 
It seems unfortunate that Judge Brogna was reluctant to follow the 
position taken by Judge Lurie in the first contempt adjudication 
(whereby the town was ordered to take affirmative action in this matter 
on the basis of the Hudson decision). Judge Brogna's decision fails to 
give full support to the policy embodied in the Clean Waters Act; a 
final resolution of this suit along the lines he suggested would unduly 
limit the division to the criminal sanctions of the act in attempting to 
reach municipal violators, thereby depriving the Commonwealth of 
the type of flexibility vital to a realistic enforcement of its antipollu-
tion laws. Presumably, the grant of both civil and criminal enforce-
ment powers to the division was made to afford that agency sufficient 
discretion in dealing with varying situations. The view expressed by 
Judge Brogna, namely, that the legislature probably did not foresee a 
situation in which full use of a court's equity powers would have to 
be directed against a municipality, is surely questionable in view of 
the language of Sections 45 and 46 of the Clean Waters Act. Section 
45 says: 
The division may require by order a city [or town] ... to pro-
vide and operate [a sewerage system or water pollution abatement 
facility] in such a manner as is in [the division's] opinion neces-
sary to insure adequate treatment prior to discharge to the waters 
of the commonwealth. . . . 
With regard to the proper forum for enforcement of the division's 
orders, Section 46 provides that "The superior court shall hav~ juris-
diction in equity to enforce such order .... " Unless the legislature 
assumed that no city or town would ever drag its feet on complying 
17 G.L., c. 21, §42 provides: "Whoever directly or indirectly throws, drains, runs or 
discharges or permits the discharge into the waters of the commonwealth organic or 
inorganic matter which shall cause, or contribute to, a condition in contravention of the 
standards adopted by the division shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars. Each day such violation continues shall be a separate offense, punish-
able by a like fine. For the purposes of this section and [Sections 43-46], inclusive, the 
words 'whoever' and 'person' shall include political subdivisions of the commonwealth 
and public corporations." 
18 G.L., c. 44, §31 provides in part that "in cases of extreme emergency involving 
the health or safety of persons or property," a majority of all the town selectmen can 
vote to authorize a specific expenditure not appropriated in the regular town meeting 
ballot. 
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with such an order, it would appear quite foreseeable that a court in 
equity might have to make use of its full powers in assuring compli-
ance with the law. 
The particular manner in which the Massachusetts legislature has 
chosen to accomplish its goal in the area of water pollution control 
is but one aspect of the present case. At stake also is the legislative 
mandate specifying enforcement in equity or orders issued to other 
municipalities by other state agencies. Should Grafton and municipal-
ities similarly situated be allowed to persist in their defiance of proper 
administrative pronouncements, the Commonwealth's ability to 
exercise vital police controls over its subordinate municipal agencies 
may be seriously jeopardized. The implications of the division's suit 
to enforce its order against Grafton may thus extend to many opera-
tional facets of the Commonwealth's administrative apparatus. 
Although the criminal prosecution and emergency appropriation 
alternatives suggested by Judge Brogna do find their source in the 
General Laws, 19 neither route is very promising in a practical sense. 
The criminal sanctions of Section 42 of the Clean Waters Act can func-
tion as a viable tool for the elimination of water pollution, but in the 
Grafton situation the division is striving to secure compliance 
with a duly issued implementation schedule. The goal, after all, is 
the construction of a suitable municipal sewerage system for Grafton. 
This goal cannot be met simply by fining the town for its continued 
contempt. The ability of the division to utilize both civil and criminal 
remedies, alternatively or jointly, is an important factor in the manner 
in which the division is able to cope with water pollution offenses of 
varying degrees and kinds. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a judge 
who is reluctant to compel an electorate to vote a specific appropria-
tion will choose to invoke criminal proceedings against the munic-
ipality that represents that electorate. It would be preferable in the 
Grafton situation for the courts to promote the legislative policy 
behind the statute through some direct enforcement of the division's 
order, rather than by resort to indirect pressures such as the fines 
provided for in Section 42, which may only interfere with the town's 
ability to fund the project. To view the civil and criminal provisions 
of the Clean Waters Act as mutually exclusive is, in fact, a misreading 
of the statute. 
The other course of action suggested by Judge Brogna, namely, the 
health emergency exception to the prescribed municipal appropriation 
procedure, 20 may prove to be an extremely unsatisfactory method for 
dealing with defiant town meetings. A court would have to find that 
Grafton's refusal to appropriate money for a sewage treatment facility 
posed a health emergency within the meaning of the statute. The 
Supreme Judicial Court, however, has construed the statute narrowly, 
for it seems clear that the legislature never intended the health emer-
gency exception to be used as a regular means for enforcing duties 
I9 Seenn.l7, 18supra. 
2°Seen.18supra. 
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imposed by legislative mandate. In a 1969 decision, Rich and Son 
Construction Co. v. Town of Saugus, the Court stated that "[t]he 
statute contemplates the immediate or prompt action that must be 
taken to avoid risk to persons or property which cannot await action 
in due course by or in behalf of the town."21 (Emphasis added.) It is 
well recognized that pronouncements of selectmen, no matter how 
forcefully expounded, will not serve in themselves to create a pre-
sumption of such an extreme health emergency.22 However, it is 
not clear whether the findings of a state regulatory agency, such as 
the Division of Water Pollution Control, may serve to create such a 
presumption. In Hudson, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the 
refusal of the town's electorate to appropriate such funds as were 
necessary to comply with the wartime public health order would 
probably give rise to a finding that such an emergency existed. 23 
The situation in cases such as Grafton, however, would appear to 
fall somewhere between the Hudson perspective and the rule in 
Saugus. Although the Hudson case would serve to posit the authority 
of a state regulatory agency to act when health emergencies arise, 
the long-standing history of the Grafton pollution problem and the 
absence of a wartime setting would make reliance upon the health 
emergency exception a most uncertain route to follow in light of the 
decision in Saugus. Of course, any reliance on the health emergency 
exception becomes groundless if the selectmen are as unwilling as 
the general electorate to vote a particular appropriation. If voter 
opposition to a proposed outlay is strong, few selectmen may be 
willing to take the risk of voting for an increase in the tax rate. 
One of the primary objectives of the Clean Waters Act is the develop-
ment of effective sewerage systems in municipalities such as Grafton. 
It seems logical, therefore, that the court's response to the Grafton 
situation should concentrate upon providing a viable formula where-
by future administrative orders to municipaliries can enjoy meaning-
ful and decisive judicial enforcement. The unregulated discharge of 
untreated or inadequately treated sewage will continue to have a 
21 355 Mass. 304, 307, 244 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1969). The Supreme Judicial Court re-
viewed an "emergency appropriation" authorized by town selectmen for an immediate 
contract to adjust insurance claims arising from fire damage to town school buildings. 
It was held that the task of rebuilding was not "materially expedited" by starting the 
adjustment process before the town electorate could pass upon that item. Because there 
was no showing that adjusting such damage had a direct bearing upon emergency action 
to prevent physical damage within the building, the Court saw no reason for the town 
to deal with the circumstances outside of normal municipal fiscal procedures. Despite 
the considerable inconvenience of the loss of use of large areas of the school plant, the 
length of time necessarily incident to full restoration of the damaged area would not, 
according to the Court, warrant such precipitous action to adjust insurance claims. 
In the Grafton situation, it would be specious to argue that correction of the sewage 
disposal problem would be "materially expedited" by having the selectmen act in lieu 
of a town meeting. The pollution condition has existed for many years and will continue 
during the time necessary for construction of a treatment plant. 
22 Continental Constr. Co. v. City of Lawrence, 297 Mass. 513, 9 N.E.2d 550, (1937). 
23 315 Mass. 335,348,52 N.E.2d566, 575 (1943). 
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devastating effect on the already polluted waterways of the Common-
wealth. 
Should the Commonwealth lose its ability to sustain a well-rounded 
approach to the problem of municipal water pollution, one foresee-
able result may be the forfeiture of federal funding that now con-
stitutes a significant portion of the division's fiscal foundation. Under 
the terms of Section 1157 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,24 
payments made in support of state water pollution control agencies 
are to terminate whenever "in the administration of [that state agen-
cy's] plan there is a failure to comply substantially with ... [the] 
requirement" that the plan provide "for extension or improvement 
of the State ... program for prevention and control of water pollu-
tion .... " 25 Various amendments to the federal act were proposed 
in November 1971. Included among them is the following provision: 
The Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] 
shall have authority ... to reduce ... the grant payable to 
such State [water pollution control program] ... if he deter-
mines, based on criteria established in regulations promulgated 
by him, that the water pollution control program of such State 
is inadequate in whole or in part. 26 
It is possible that the evisceration of the Massachusetts Clean Waters 
Act that would result from a failure to enforce municipal compliance 
would serve as a basis for a thorough reexamination by the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency of the adequacy of the Common-
wealth's efforts to control water pollution. Should the federal agency 
take the position that the division's program was inadequate owing 
to its lack of control over municipalities, the resulting cutback in 
federal funding would cripple the division's efforts. 
In three successive court sittings it has been established that the 
town of Grafton is bound by the terms of the Clean Waters Act to take 
such steps as found necessary by the Division of Water Pollution Con-
trol to abate the town's pollution of the Blackstone River. As stated 
in Hudson, a town exists as a "subordinate agency of State govern-
ment"27 and "is in no position to defy its creator, the Common-
wealth, or to attempt to nullify legislative mandates issued under the 
authority of the General Court. " 28 That Grafton has proceeded to 
defy such a mandate is a matter of record. The pattern of Grafton's 
response to the superior court poses a direct challenge to the authority 
24 33 U.S.C. §§1151 et seq. 
2s Id. §§1157(f)-1157(g). 
26 S. Doc. No. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); referred to the Committee on Public 
Works. From the outset, federal grants to state water pollution control programs have 
been contingent upon the state meeting a standard of performance in enforcing its water 
quality program. Certainly it is a logical assumption that such provisions will appear 
as a control mechanism in future federal enactments in furtherance of this objective. 
27 315 Mass. 335,344,52 N.E.2d566, 572 (1943). 
28 ld. at 345,52 N.E.2dat 573. 
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of the courts of the Commonwealth to enforce any such legislative 
policy. 
Despite the broad power that Hudson apparently conveyed to the 
Massachusetts judiciary, the superior court faces a formidable dilem-
ma in fashioning a practical method for compelling delinquent 
municipalities to perform specific affirmative acts. In typical situa-
tions, courts may frustrate contemptuous behavior by identifying and 
punishing persons responsible for the defiance of court orders. The 
problem of finding a suitable entity upon which the court can exert 
its pressure is made particularly acute by the town meeting form of 
government employed in Grafton. Contempt proceedings undertaken 
against the city council form of government may be facilitated some-
what by the presence of persons representative of the city's qfficial 
actions.29 The degree of directness of citizen participation in the 
routine matters of fiscal appropriation and expenditure may assist 
the court in identifying those who can be held responsible. City 
councillors, whose identities are known and whose number is fixed, 
can easily function as such targets. In City of Vernon v. Superior 
Court, 30 the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 
jail sentences of five city councillors for their failure to comply with 
a mandatory injunction ordering them to provide for the city's sewage 
disposal. In Grafton and like communities, the use of the direct ballot 
procedure of the town meeting restricts the ability of the court to 
meet due process standards in taking action for criminal contempt. 
The utilization of fines for civil contempt, imposed on the town itself, 
may serve as one method of exacting compliance by such towns. In 
Department of Health v. Borough of Fort Lee31 and In re West Wild-
wood,32 daily contempt penalties were assessed against municipal-
ities until they complied with court orders regarding sewage disposal 
facilities. It is clear, however, that the repeated use of penal fines 
works against the funding of municipal facilities, regardless of how 
effective such fines may be in stressing to the town the court's desire 
that it act in a certain fashion. 
In its effort to compel compliance by the town of Grafton, the court 
has the choice of continuing the use of contempt fines-albeit at a 
level more coercive than the $2000 fine levied in Judge Lurie's decree-
or of seeking a method whereby the system could be built without 
resort to the town meeting process. In enforcing orders duly issued 
under the exercise of the state's police power, it is necessary that the 
courts be willing to place upon such delinquent municipalities the 
29 "The fundamental . . . distinction between the town and the city organization is 
that in the former all the qualified inhabitants meet together to deliberate and vote as 
individuals . . . while in the latter all municipal functions are performed by deputies. 
The one is direct, the other is representative." Opinion of the Justices, 229 Mass. 601, 
609, ll9 N.E. 778, 781 (1918). 
50 38Cal. 2d509, 241 P.2d243 (1952) (Los Angeles County). 
51 108 N.J. Eq. 139, 154A. 319 (Ch. 1931). 
32 42 N.J. Super. 282, 126A.2d233 (Ch. 1956). 
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same burdens incurred by other municipalities that voluntarily ac-
quiesce to similar administrative orders. Where town voters adamantly 
refuse to fulfill the duties imposed upon them by statute, further dis-
charge of such duties may have to be taken out of the hands of the elec-
torate and vested in the court in order that interests vital to the public 
health may be protected. To this end, a municipality's funds would 
have to be placed within the reach of the court. Resorting to the full 
equity powers outlined in Hudson, a court may consider itself em-
powered to isolate and attach municipal funds presently or potentially 
earmarked for some nonessential governmental activity. Should it 
prove difficult for the court to delve into the operations of the munic-
ipal treasury, there is another source of municipal funds from which 
a Massachusetts court may draw .. The annual state-aid disbursements 
(the so-called cherry sheets), by virtue of their segregation from other 
municipal assets during the period in which they are held by the 
Commonwealth, are an appropriate subject for judicial attachment. 
The court could sequester sufficient funds to provide for the financing 
of a sewage treatment facility in Grafton. This procedure could be 
repeated annually until such time as the town voters evidenced their 
willingness to discharge their statutory duty or until the facility be-
came operational. As long as this procedure would be necessary, the 
funds would be payable directly from the Commonwealth to the court. 
Although such a procedure may appear to be quite drastic in view of 
the repercussions it would have upon the town's tax rate, the effects 
should be virtually the same as if the town had voluntarily complied. 
There is, moreover, some statutory justification for utilizing por-
tions of "cherry sheet" disbursements to discharge obligations owed 
to the Commonwealth by municipalities. General Laws, c. 58, §20A 
provides that if 
there is due the commonwealth any sum from such city or town, 
for any service or cause whatsoever, such sum so due to the com-
monwealth shall be deducted ... from the amount so distribu-
table or payable to the city or town, and shall be applied to the 
payment of the sum so due to the commonwealth. 
In light of the subordinate role of a town in its relationship to the 
Commonwealth, it can be argued that funds granted to towns should 
be contingent not only upon specific money debts owed the Common-
wealth but also upon other social debts owed to the sovereign and 
the interests it seeks to protect. Taken in concert with the grant of 
jurisdiction conveyed in Hudson, Section 20A would support the 
premise that "cherry sheet" disbursements are necessarily subject to 
all paramount claims of the Commonwealth, both legal and equitable, 
that may arise from a breach of duty by a municipality. The power to 
effect total compliance is directly within the powers of courts of 
equity. Here the court has the opportunity to minimize the effect of 
the obstinate town meeting. In doing so, it could not only reaffirm 
its authority to order municipalities to perform affirmative acts 
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essential to the public interest, but it would also formulate a model 
for solving dilemmas posed by municipalities defiant of administra-
tive authority and legislative policy. In light of the continued refusal 
of Grafton to meet its obligations under the Clean Waters Act, it may 
be necessary that the court consider taking such firm and decisive 
action to insure that the Commonwealth's public health goals are 
met. 
Given the present condition of the Commonwealth's waters and 
the deleterious effect that the discharge of improperly treated sewage 
can have upon these resources, it is most undesirable that municipal-
ities should be able to operate contrary to the policies of the Massachu-
setts Clean Waters Act. In addition to the aforementioned conse-
quences of municipal inaction, such as possible cuts in federal funding, 
it is also possible that industries and private institutions will begin to 
challenge the division's orders as applied to them. An equal protec-
tion argument may be made if cities and towns are not required to 
help meet the water quality standards applicable to all waterways, 
regardless of the source of pollution. 
JOHN J. O'BRIEN 
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